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SPATIAL MOBILITY AND SOCIAL OUTCOMES 
 
Abstract  
 
This paper examines the nature and extent of socio-spatial mobility in Great Britain. In 
contrast with previous studies, we investigate the entire spectrum of moves within and across 
the hierarchical structure of neighbourhoods. We use data from the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS) to trace moves between neighbourhoods defined using the Indices of Multiple 
Deprivation. We define upward socio-spatial mobility as moving to neighbourhoods with 
greater levels of advantage (lower levels of deprivation), and downward socio-spatial mobility 
as the shift to less advantaged neighbourhoods. As expected, the results show that there are 
strong associations between origin and destination neighbourhood types. We find that 
education and income play critical roles in the ability of individuals to make neighbourhood 
gains when they move. An important finding of the research is the way in which the housing 
market structurally conditions socio-spatial mobility. In the UK and probably more broadly, 
the opportunity to move to socially advantaged places is highly stratified by housing tenure. 
 
Keywords: residential mobility, residential sorting, socio-economic status, deprivation, 
neighbourhoods 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The neighbourhoods we live in to a large extent reflect our socio-economic position in 
society, as our purchasing power determines the types of places we can access (Cheshire, 
2011). As such, possessing the ability to move and especially the ability to leave less 
advantaged neighbourhoods is central for achieving the social gains and access to 
opportunities provided by more advantaged locations. Moving to a more advantaged 
neighbourhood is often also an escape from the problems that are concentrated in less 
advantaged places. As a result, it is often argued that residential mobility and migration are 
key mechanisms for effecting social mobility. This is of great relevance in the United 
Kingdom (UK), as the 2011 Strategy for Social Mobility suggests that greater social fluidity 
benefits society as a whole by producing gains in both productivity and subjective well-being 
(Cabinet Office, 2011). 
 While there is a large literature examining social mobility in terms of income, social 
class and employment status (Goldthorpe and Llewellyn, 1987; Breen, 2004) less is known 
about the mobility of people between different types of neighbourhoods. There is a large 
literature examining moves into and out of the most disadvantaged neighbourhoods (Bailey 
and Livingston, 2008), but there is still much to learn about mobility patterns across the entire 
neighbourhood hierarchy. In particular, we need to know more about those who make lateral 
moves between similar types of neighbourhood (thereby making limited gains in 
neighbourhood status or quality), as well as those who move up and make the social gains we 
often associate with the notion that we ‘move to improve’. As a result, our analysis seeks to 
improve our understanding of residential mobility in the context of local places and their 
characteristics by measuring the odds of people changing their position within the whole 
socio-spatial system. Because the spatial and social are so clearly intertwined we invoke the 
notion of movement across spatial scales, which by definition brings social change. As a 
significant addition to previous work we ask how much mobility there is for mid-level 
households. Are these households able to affect upward social mobility with residential 
change, or is it only the affluent that can move and move up, so that other households are 
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marginalized and left to “pick up the pieces”? Their mobility as well as their location may 
therefore be residualized within the larger urban mosaic. 
As residential mobility is the engine of change in the city, exploring who gains and 
loses through (im)mobility will enrich our understanding of how individuals effect social 
mobility.  Thus, our study asks which individuals and households can adjust their housing and 
neighbourhood circumstances by moving and whether such geographic adjustments increase 
or decrease their socio-spatial mobility. Answering this question on geographic adjustments is 
important for understanding the recursive relationships between individual moving behavior 
and the changing geography of socio-economically stratified neighbourhoods. As most people 
only move very short distances when they relocate, we expect that most people move within 
very similar types of neighbourhoods (Bailey and Livingston, 2007). Still, we know that some 
households are able to make quite large changes in their neighbourhood contexts and it is 
these ‘off-diagonal’ moves which are also important in understanding spatial outcomes and 
upward and downward mobility. We also investigate the specific role of the urban structure, 
notably housing tenures, in facilitating or negating mobility opportunities.  
Specifically, our paper seeks to answer three questions – (1) how localized are moves 
across the socio-spatial structure? (2) what are the predictors of movement across the socio-
spatial structure? and (3) to what extent can people move up the socio-spatial ladder given 
their neighbourhood of origin? The long term run of the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS) provides the research data base to realistically evaluate the influence of residential on 
socio-spatial change in the UK. Using a longitudinal resource such as the BHPS also enables 
us to analyze socio-spatial stability, as we can identify individuals who are immobile over 
long periods of time.  
 
 
Previous Research 
 
The long history of mobility research beginning with the work of Park, Burgess and the 
Chicago school has been infused by the notion that we move to improve. This perspective 
emphasizes that people make a series of moves over the life course in order to bring their 
housing needs and employment opportunities into equilibrium and hence attain higher levels 
of satisfaction (Clark and Dieleman, 1996; Martin and Lichter, 1983). This interest in the 
individual dimension of social change has been paralleled by a concern for the role of place in 
structuring social mobility (van Ham and Manley, 2010; van Ham et al., 2012), particularly 
on the part of governments who have sought to create “communities of opportunity” – places 
with good schools, access to jobs, quality housing choices, safe streets, services and strong 
social networks. As residential mobility provides the mechanism linking the social mobility of 
individuals to the changing composition of neighbourhoods, understanding how places 
influence and are simultaneously influenced by mobility requires an integrated place and 
household based approach (Bailey and Livingston, 2008). This has been a frequent theme in 
recent policy programs, which often aim to integrate disparate approaches to social inequality 
and deprivation (Manley et al., 2013).  
Understanding the spatial structure of metropolitan areas and also the geography of 
residential mobility requires consideration of both housing prices and ethnicity. Over time, 
differences in preferences and purchasing power have created a residential mosaic that is 
stratified by both class and race (Friedman, 2011; South et al, 2005). It is within this mosaic 
that the choices of households are made, in turn reinforcing or reconstructing the mosaic as 
the choices are executed. Residential mobility outcomes are not random, but are influenced by 
the ability of individuals to ‘reveal’ their preferences to live near to similar households (for 
instance in terms of income, composition and ethnicity). The aggregate outcome of the 
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execution of constrained choices is sorting, resulting in the grouping (segregation) of similar 
individuals into spatially defined areas (neighbourhoods) from which we often observe 
common outcomes. For example, the fact that Toronto’s neighbourhoods have become more 
polarized by income over the last few decades could reflect the increasing attention assumed 
neighbourhood effects have received by those with the ability to choose (Hulchanski, 2007). It 
seems likely that the greater the resources available to households, the greater their ability to 
discriminate among possible places to live. In time, this selective mobility will increase the 
polarization of neighbourhoods, which will in turn influence residential mobility patterns. 
This underlines the way in which selective migration processes can erode any gains made by 
place-based responses to concentrated disadvantage (Bailey and Livingston, 2008). 
At the same time, societies often strive to limit the uneven distribution of household 
income for both equity and efficiency reasons. However, individuals and their families are 
highly spatially correlated in both socio-economic and educational terms. Where housing is 
allocated primarily through the market, families group spatially and will likely generate 
distributional inequality (Worner, 2006; Cheshire, 2011). This could have implications for the 
social attainment of residents. If the residential sorting process helps to polarize 
neighbourhoods, some places will experience a more rapid socio-economic descent than 
others. This descent process may in turn initiate threshold effects on the social behavior of 
residents (Meen, 2006; Meen et al., 2012). In this sense, neighbourhoods can have the 
potential to generate effects (both positive and negative) which result directly from residential 
sorting, as extensive reviews of the literature have shown (Dietz, 2002; Durlauf, 2004; 
Friedrichs et al., 2003; van Ham et al., 2012).  
Life course theories suggest that understanding the links between individual moving 
behavior and the spatial patterning of neighbourhoods requires considering how macro-
contextual factors influence residential mobility (Mulder and Hooimeijer, 1999). This can 
occur when housing is allocated bureaucratically, as it is in the British social (public) housing 
sector1. Thus, as access to social housing is typically restricted to the most economically 
marginal households and stock is often concentrated in the least desirable places (Burrows, 
1999), the social housing system can channel the most disadvantaged people into the least 
advantaged places. Whether, and to what extent, this spatial organization of income inequality 
affects socio-spatial mobility processes will emerge as a major contribution from the 
empirical analysis in our paper. While we expect to find significant ‘within-neighbourhood’ 
lateral socio-spatial mobility, there may be more adjustment in the full matrix than is typically 
recognized by studies focusing solely on poor neighbourhoods (Bailey and Livingston, 2007). 
There is already a substantial literature examining moves out of deprived areas (South 
and Crowder, 1997; South et al., 2005; Quillian, 2003), as well as churning and mobility 
processes across deprived neighbourhoods (Robson et al., 2008). However until recently, 
much less attention has been directed towards the entire spectrum of neighbourhoods that 
households enter, reside within and subsequently exit. This is now changing, with new studies 
of neighbourhood effects devoting increasing attention to processes of neighbourhood sorting 
(van Ham and Clark, 2009; Feijten and van Ham, 2009; Hedman et al., 2011). Much of this 
newer literature does not however focus specifically on the role of mobility, as the emphasis 
still tends to be on where people live and not where they move to.  
Changes in residential mobility patterns make it valuable to re-examine the links 
between neighbourhood status and neighbourhood choices. Both aging and affluence have 
increased the proportion of discretionary moves, thereby increasing the importance of life 
style and consumption based influences for mobility. The growing proportion of in-migrants 
                                                          
1 The British housing system is often considered to consist of three basic tenure regimes: homeownership, social 
rental (housing rented at below market rates from a local authority or housing association) and private rental 
(housing rented through the market system). 
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from ethnic minority groups alters locational preferences as well. Enlarged commuting fields 
extend the range of residential adjustment options (Eliasson et al., 2003). Many of these 
factors impinge upon the choice of location, the duration of residence and the stage in life 
when people decide to move. 
Two recent British studies have taken up the issue of residential mobility, tenure and 
the inter-relationship with neighbourhood contexts (Boheim and Taylor, 2002; Rabe and 
Taylor, 2010). These studies specifically address actual moves between neighbourhoods and 
regions. While the first of these studies is more concerned with the joint housing and job 
mobility process, Rabe and Taylor (2010) focus on neighbourhoods themselves to show that 
life course events do not always lead to neighbourhood quality adjustments. Importantly, 
Rabe and Taylor (2010) separate and analyze both the objective and subjective gains/losses 
people make moving between neighbourhoods. Our study is related but directed more towards 
the broad probability of making gains or suffering losses in neighbourhood quality consequent 
on a move between neighbourhoods. In a break with much previous research, we seek to 
analyze changes in neighbourhood quality across the full spectrum of neighbourhood types 
(Bolt et al., 2008; Clark and Rivers, 2012). Recently, a New Zealand study of movement 
across a set of neighbourhoods found that the degree of upward mobility achieved is 
negatively affected by the level of deprivation at the neighbourhood of origin. Even after 
controlling for the attributes of movers, people moving from more deprived areas were found 
to have a lower degree of upward mobility than movers from more advantaged places (Clark 
and Morrison, 2011). The current paper extends these studies, focusing in particular on how 
the housing market conditions the social mobility of movers. 
 
  
Data preparation  
 
BHPS data 
Given the detailed information collected by the UK census, linking individual census records 
through time can provide insight into how individuals move through different types of 
neighbourhood across the life course. Such an approach is, however, constrained by the ten-
year intervals separating census observations. This weakness can be overcome by integrating 
longitudinal data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) with micro-geographic 
information derived from other sources. This approach enables us to test hypotheses linking 
the changing attributes and composition of households to the changes in neighbourhood 
outcomes which can occur with spatial mobility. 
This study draws on the original BHPS sample of 10,300 individuals interviewed in 
1991 and tracked and re-interviewed each subsequent year until 2008 (Taylor et al., 2010). 
The sample also includes individuals from approximately 3,000 ‘booster’ Scottish and Welsh 
households tracked from 1999 to 2008. After transforming the dataset into person-year 
format, one individual from each original and booster household was randomly selected in 
1991 and 1999 respectively.2 These individuals were then tracked across all waves of the 
survey. Young adults living with their parents were not eligible for selection, as they have not 
been responsible for choosing their initial residential location. Following random selection, 
we are left with 8,421 individuals providing a nominal total of 102,331 person-year 
                                                          
2 This procedure ensures that only one person per household is included in our analyses. Including 
multiple members from the same household would bias our results against the relocation decisions of 
smaller households. Of course, we cannot know how significantly the selected household member 
influenced relocation decisions. This may be problematic in the case of ‘tied movers’, whose moving 
behaviour is strongly influenced by the needs of their partner (Cooke, 2008).  
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observations. This pool of person-years was used to derive the sample for each of our 
analyses. While attrition rates in the BHPS are comparatively low (Buck, 2000), the long 
duration of our study does mean that many of these cases are unusable due to participant 
dropout and occasional non-response. This could be problematic if attrition is selective, 
although results reported by Rabe and Taylor (2010) indicate that attrition has fairly minimal 
effects upon wave-to-wave analyses of mobility using the BHPS.  
 
Indices of Multiple Deprivation   
Micro-geographic information on the location of residence was then merged onto each 
person-year record to identify where each person was living each year. Given the devolved 
nature of UK administration, the available micro-geographic units differ between 
England/Wales and Scotland. Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs) were available for 
individuals in England and Wales, while the datazone (DZ) of residence was merged onto 
records from individuals in Scotland. Both LSOAs and DZs are constructed at a very fine 
scale. LSOAs contain an average of 1,500 people, while the average population of a Scottish 
datazone is 750 (ONS, 2010). Although often overlooked in studies of neighbourhood change, 
it is important to remain aware that how neighbourhoods are defined can affect the results3. 
Our focus on very fine scale micro-geographies helps minimize these issues. 
Measures capturing the level of LSOA/DZ ‘advantage’ were then merged onto the 
BHPS dataset. Here we draw upon the Indices of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) produced for 
each devolved administration; IMD 2004 for England, SIMD 2004 for Scotland and WIMD 
2005 for Wales. Each index is computed using information about the LSOA/DZ across 
multiple domains of ‘deprivation’ (see Noble et al., 2004; Scottish Executive, 2004; Welsh 
Government, 2005 for full details). The raw data for each indicator come from a variety of 
administrative or census sources (Noble et al., 2004; Scottish Executive, 2004; Welsh 
Government, 2005). After each LSOA/DZ has been allocated a score in each domain, the 
domain scores are transformed, combined and weighted to give overall LSOA/DZ score and 
rank values. Less advantaged LSOA/DZs are allocated higher IMD scores. An important 
assumption with our use of the IMD measures is that deprivation values calculated in 2004-
2005 are appropriate for the entire study period (1991-2008). This may not be the case if 
neighbourhood attributes change rapidly, although existing evidence suggests that relative 
levels of neighbourhood quality remain quite static over time (Meen et al., 2007; Meen et al., 
2012). The problem of changing neighbourhood attributes is also minimized by the indicators 
used to compute the IMD measures. In many cases, the raw data used to calculate the domain 
scores were gathered several years before the publication of each index4.  
In addition to calculating a score for each LSOA/DZ, LSOA/DZs are also ranked 
based upon their relative level of neighbourhood quality. These rank values can be grouped 
into deciles. In this study, decile 1 contains the most advantaged 10% of LSOA/DZs within 
each country, while decile 10 contains the least advantaged 10%. The distribution of scores by 
decile for each country is presented in Table 1, while the distribution of English IMD scores 
by decile is depicted graphically in Figure 1 (the Scottish and Welsh equivalents are highly 
similar). Figure 1 shows that the less advantaged the decile, the larger the range of 
neighbourhood scores within it. This is partly due to the methodology used to construct the 
IMD indices (which are specifically designed to identify small pockets of deprivation), but it 
                                                          
3 This is often termed the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem/Phenomenon (MAUP) (Manley, 2006). 
4 Census derived indices of socio-economic (dis)advantage (Townsend and Carstairs scores) were also 
considered. These indices consist of deprivation scores produced for geographic units using four 
census variables about the socio-economic composition of the area. However, the multidimensional 
nature of socio-economic (dis)advantage captured by the IMD indicators made these more attractive 
for this study.  
6 
 
also reflects the huge variation in neighbourhood quality within the least advantaged decile. It 
is important to be aware that the construction of the IMD measures varies between countries 
(ONS, 2010)5. Although this means that the raw scores are not directly comparable over 
national boundaries, Table 1 shows that the distribution of scores by decile does not actually 
differ substantially across countries. Hence, we feel it is justifiable to pool observations from 
across the three countries when analyzing how individuals move between different types of 
neighbourhood.  
 
***TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE*** 
***FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
Each time an individual was observed to have moved between two consecutive waves of the 
BHPS, we computed a change score variable by comparing the IMD scores of the origin and 
destination LSOA/DZ. Positive changes in score indicate moves to less advantaged 
neighbourhoods, while decreases in scores denote moves to more advantaged 
neighbourhoods. We also observed whether moving individuals changed their neighbourhood 
decile. To provide some additional contextual information about the effects of changing 
neighbourhood decile, Table 2 provides summary statistics (derived from the 2001 Census) 
about the ethnic, socio-economic and tenure composition of the different neighbourhood 
deciles in each of the devolved administrations. The table shows that in England, the least 
advantaged deciles have large proportions of non-white ethnic groups. Scotland and Wales 
have much lower proportions of ethnic minorities and these are more evenly distributed across 
the neighbourhood hierarchy. Across all three countries, the unemployment rate rises as the 
level of neighbourhood disadvantage increases. The least advantaged deciles in all three 
countries are also characterized by concentrations of social housing, although the relationship 
between private renting and neighbourhood (dis)advantage is more varied and ambiguous. 
 
*** TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
Research Findings 
 
Matrices of movement and stability 
 
Initial analyses reveal that an average of 10.8% of BHPS participants changed address in each 
year of the survey (Buck, 2000; Boheim and Taylor, 2002). This closely matches estimates of 
British mobility rates derived from both the 2001 Census and Labour Force Survey data 
(Dixon, 2003: 192; Bailey and Livingston, 2007: 14). Bailey and Livingston’s (2007) 
analyses of 2001 Census data show that this mobility rate varies somewhat across deprivation 
deciles, ranging from a rate of about 8% in the least advantaged deciles to c.11.5% in the most 
advantaged deciles6. Importantly, Bailey and Livingston’s work demonstrates that these 
differences in turnover rates are primarily driven by the population composition of the 
different neighbourhood deciles, rather than the characteristics of the deciles themselves. 
With this contextual background in mind, we begin by investigating the pattern of 
movement by origin and destination neighbourhood for all move events in our sample. These 
                                                          
5 This may constitute a further advantage over census based indices, as it enables us to more 
effectively capture geographical differences in the nature of socio-economic (dis)advantage.  
6 The suggestion by the editors to comment on overall and across decile rates provides a background 
for the analysis of the moves themselves, The rates reported here are derived from the gross turnover 
rates by decile as reported in Bailey and Livingston (2007).  
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patterns confirm that the majority of moves are made ‘laterally’ between similar types of 
neighbourhood (Table 3). In addition, the proportion of transitions decreases as the difference 
in deprivation between the origin and destination neighbourhoods grows. The concentration in 
the decile of origin varies from around 40% for the least advantaged neighbourhoods, to 
somewhat more than a third for the most advantaged areas. Overall, slightly more than one 
quarter of all movers stayed within the neighbourhood of origin, while the middle level 
neighbourhoods had much lower levels of retention than either extreme. Clearly, it is within 
the middle range of neighbourhoods that much of the neighbourhood change is occurring.  
Overall, 51.4% of all moves were either within the neighbourhood of origin or to a 
neighbourhood within an adjacent decile. Large changes in neighbourhood quality with a 
move are quite rare. This may be because most households have limited financial resources 
and cannot buy into significantly better neighbourhoods. In addition, neighbourhood 
(dis)advantage is spatially concentrated and most moves occur over short distances. 
Nonetheless, we can see from the matrix that there is considerable movement in the off-
diagonal cells. These moves will be the focus of our subsequent analyses. 
 
***TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
The matrix highlights what will be a central point in our discussion, that movers from 
different origin neighbourhoods do not distribute themselves randomly across available 
destinations. On the contrary, the table illustrates the systematic relationship between origin 
and destination deciles. At the same time the  probabilities of movement shows that overall, 
there is a significant likelihood of moving to a more advantaged neighbourhood when 
relocating. Table 3 shows that there is a 41.8% chance that a move will be made to a more 
advantaged neighbourhood, in comparison to a 31.6% chance that a move will lead to a 
poorer neighbourhood. In the context of “we move to improve”, the data demonstrate that 
individuals who move typically make status gains. The table emphasizes that over our period 
of study there is considerable re-adjustment as households make their housing and social 
moves in tandem. 
While the table shows some socio-spatial fluidity, there is also considerable social and 
spatial stability beyond that visible in Table 3. We could call it the background structure in 
which moves occur but they do not “break out” of their local areas. For complete (eighteen 
year) records and excluding the booster sample members, further analysis showed that on 
average individuals live about eight to twelve years in the decile in which they were observed 
in 1991. A not insignificant number of people have been in the same decile for most of their 
residential careers. This suggests that while mobility has been the major concern of studies of 
social change, immobility should be given much more attention if we are to better understand 
how much social change occurs in a given society (Cooke, 2011; Coulter and van Ham, 
2013). People who move locally, but do not change neighbourhood type, and those who do 
not move at all, are together a measure of the lack of dynamism in the system. 
 
Understanding changes in neighbourhood types 
The previous section focused on the movements of all individuals between different 
types of neighbourhoods. In this section we unpack these aggregate changes to investigate 
how three important factors - age, income and housing tenure – are linked to the 
neighbourhood outcomes of moves. In the following discussion, it is important to keep in 
mind that there are structural constraints in the movement across neighbourhood types. A 
household or individual in the most advantaged group of neighbourhoods can only remain 
where they are or move to neighbourhoods which are less advantaged, and, as a corollary, 
households or individuals in the least advantaged neighbourhoods can only increase their 
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status or remain where they are. To move beyond the significant tendency to remain in the 
neighbourhood of origin or a nearby neighbourhood (seen in Table 3), we therefore define 
changes as spatial movements involving a change in neighbourhood quality of at least two 
deciles in status. 
It has been well established that younger people generally move more frequently than 
older people (Clark and Dieleman, 1996). But although age is strongly linked to the 
probability of moving, it is less a determinant for the probability of moving up or down in 
status, as the differences across age are muted (Table 4a, 4b). Above the middle deciles, there 
is a slightly higher probability of younger individuals moving up and this is also true for older 
individuals in the middle ranges of the advantage scale. Those in deciles 5 and 6 are more 
likely to move up and less likely to move down. Clearly, their life course trajectory is still one 
of upward mobility in the housing market. Although the cell sizes in Tables 4a and 4b are 
rather small, Tables 4a and b still provide powerful evidence of considerable fluidity in the 
overall matrix. It seems unlikely that larger samples would alter these basic results.  
 
***TABLES 4a, 4b ABOUT HERE*** 
 
While age has a rather muted impact, household income is closely associated with the 
neighbourhood outcomes of residential moves (Tables 5a, 5b). Individuals in the lowest 
quartile of real household incomes are significantly more likely to move to less advantaged 
areas. In contrast, higher incomes provide the opportunity for people to move up or maintain 
residence in more advantaged places. Very few households in the top income quartile move to 
very disadvantaged neighbourhoods. This finding reiterates the structural difficulty for lower 
income households to make more than marginal gains in neighbourhood quality when they 
move, demonstrating that selective mobility flows help to produce stratified neighbourhoods. 
 
***TABLE 5a, 5b ABOUT HERE*** 
 
 Tenure and income are related and the outcomes across tenure reinforce the effect of 
socio-economic status on residential relocations (Tables 6a, 6b). Again the extremes have 
relatively small samples (e.g. very few social renters live and move within the most 
advantaged deciles), but the overall pattern is clear. Homeowners are more often able to move 
out of less advantaged areas and social renters are likely to move out of the most advantaged 
areas and down the neighbourhood hierarchy. It appears that social renters, even if they live 
initially in more advantaged neighbourhoods, are unable to maintain their status in such 
neighbourhoods when they move. This could be due to the relative concentration of socially 
rented properties in less desirable locations (Table 2). In addition, social renters moving into 
private rental housing are likely to only be able to afford properties with low rents in the least 
desirable locations. Again, our findings reiterate that the housing market conditions and 
structures household mobility behavior, reproducing the socio-economic segmentation of 
neighbourhoods. 
 
***TABLES 6a, 6b ABOUT HERE*** 
 
Changes in neighbourhood scores with residential moves 
Thus far the analysis has focused on the changes in deprivation decile which can occur with 
mobility. We now turn to investigate changes in the raw LSOA/DZ scores. When an 
individual moves from one neighbourhood to another there is an associated change in their 
deprivation score. We can derive this change score value (Sij) by subtracting the origin 
neighbourhood score (Si) from the destination neighbourhood score (Sj) Hence: 
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 Sij = Sj– Si 
 
This change score can be quite modest and in such cases, the household or individual is likely 
to move within the current decile category. Over all the waves of the BHPS, the changes in 
deprivation scores range from about -60 to +60 points, with the majority of changes clustered 
in the range of -10 to +10. Indeed, approximately half of all moves generate a score change 
between -8 and +5. This reinforces our argument that most individuals move between similar 
types of neighbourhood. 
To understand the effect of neighbourhood of origin on subsequent mobility outcomes, 
we estimate exploratory linear regression models where the change in the IMD score 
occurring with a move is the dependent variable. In these models, we use the IMD score of 
the origin neighbourhood as the sole independent variable. We show two regression models 
containing the score changes for movers from all countries in a scatter plot (Figure 2). Given 
that Tables 6a and 6b have shown that housing tenure has a particularly strong influence on 
the neighbourhood changes which occur with mobility, we have estimated separate regression 
lines for different tenure groups. These are the downward sloping lines on the graphs, with the 
narrow shading around each line indicating the 95% confidence intervals of the estimate. 
There is evidence that these relationships are somewhat nonlinear, so we estimate the lines 
using the equation: 
 
 Sij =  1Si 2Si2  
 
In the plot we have also superimposed the decile boundaries (for England only) that 
were the definitions for the matrices of movement discussed earlier. Because of the nature of 
the neighbourhood scores, a move from a less advantaged neighbourhood to a more 
advantaged neighbourhood will reduce the change score value. The line at Y=0 separates 
movers according to whether they moved to a neighbourhood that ranked higher or lower than 
the one they left. In general, the plot shows that those movers who begin in better 
neighbourhoods tend to move ‘down’ by moving to less advantaged places. In contrast, those 
leaving less advantaged neighbourhoods are more likely to move ‘up’ to (slightly) more 
advantaged neighbourhoods. This partially reflects the tendency for movers to regress towards 
the mean when they relocate.  
 
***FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
We can interpret the slope of the tenure lines as a measure of households’ ability to 
move across the urban structure, as defined by deciles of advantage and disadvantage. If there 
was no slope then there would be no socio-spatial mobility, i.e. no change in neighbourhood 
quality with moves. Both slopes indicate that the rate of upward mobility increases with 
greater levels of disadvantage. However, housing tenure seems to play a key role in 
conditioning the changes in neighbourhood quality which occur with spatial mobility. Overall, 
homeowners from more advantaged neighbourhoods make smaller losses than social renters 
when they relocate. Homeowners are also more likely to make larger gains when leaving the 
least advantaged places. Therefore social renters living anywhere within the neighbourhood 
hierarchy appear to be disadvantaged when they move. A combination of lower incomes and 
their constrained choice set intersect to reduce the opportunities for social renters. We have 
omitted private renters from the graph because the confidence intervals clearly overlap with 
those of both homeowners and social renters. The regression line for private renters is highly 
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curvilinear, suggesting accelerating improvements with reduced advantage, possibly as these 
individuals are moving into homeownership. 
  
Models of sorting and residential change  
We now wish to uncover the joint effects of household and housing characteristics on the 
spatial outcomes of residential moves. To do this requires estimating a series of panel models 
which account for the nesting of person-years within individuals. The variables used in these 
analyses are summarized in Table 7, while Tables 8 and 9 contain the blocks of models. Our 
previous results have shown that the level of advantage of the origin neighbourhood 
conditions the type of quality changes that occur with residential moves. To control for this 
while avoiding the use of lagged dependent variables, we estimate separate models for 
individuals moving out of different types of neighbourhood. We estimate separate models for 
moves originating in the least advantaged three deciles, most advantaged three deciles and 
middle four deciles of neighbourhoods. This subdivision was chosen to balance the competing 
demands of increasing the homogeneity of origin neighbourhoods while retaining sufficient 
cases to provide statistical power. Subdividing the models by origin neighbourhood also 
enables us to investigate whether different factors affect the outcomes of moving from the 
least and most advantaged neighbourhoods.  
 
Table 8 contains three random effects models where the dependent variable is the 
LSOA/DZ score of the destination neighbourhood. The independent variables in this analysis 
consist of a number of time-varying individual and household attributes, as well as time-
varying contextual variables capturing changes in the local context through time (for instance 
changes in local house prices and regional unemployment rates). As the relationship between 
these factors and changes in neighbourhood quality may vary over the life course, we provide 
an appendix with age-disaggregated versions of the models included in Table 8. There is little 
evidence that disaggregating the models by age affects the results but Tables A1-A3 provide 
data on these models disaggregated by age. As neighbourhood quality can only change 
through spatial mobility, immobile cases are excluded from this analysis. Random effects 
models address the issue of the non-independence of observations by decomposing the error 
term in the regression equation into a randomly drawn individual-specific term and an 
idiosyncratic error term (Wooldridge, 2010). This means that the random effects equation 
takes the following form: 
 
itiiittit zxy    
 
For individual i at time point t, itx and iz  are vectors of coefficients on time-varying 
and time-constant independent variables (Allison, 2009: 21). The i term indicates the 
random effects, while it  is idiosyncratic error. This specification assumes that the random 
effects are not correlated with any of the other independent variables. With panel data, there 
is also the possibility that the error terms are auto-correlated within individuals over time. As 
a result, we use cluster-robust standard errors in all our models. We also include period 
dummies in our models to control for the year in which the person was interviewed (see 
Table 7 for details and summary statistics).  
 
***TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
 The models in Table 8 reiterate many of the basic findings visible in the bivariate 
results. While age has strong links to moving propensities neither age, gender nor ethnicity 
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have significant effects on the neighbourhood outcomes of mobility (barring the positive 
coefficient for age in the middle model). In contrast, partnership status is significantly 
associated with neighbourhood outcomes. Singles are more likely to move to less advantaged 
neighbourhoods than couples and there is evidence that partnership dissolution can have 
negative consequences for individuals outside the most advantaged neighbourhoods. 
Education appears strongly associated with the neighbourhood outcomes of moves. As 
education increases, the propensity of individuals to move to more advantaged places 
increases relative to individuals with little formal education. High levels of education appear 
to be important in effecting upward socio-spatial mobility, especially from the least 
advantaged neighbourhoods. 
Individuals who are not employed are more likely than those who are continuously 
employed to move to less advantaged places. However, there are no significant effects of 
household income. This may be because income is both strongly correlated with education 
and also associated with selection into different housing tenures. The three models reinforce 
our argument that housing tenure structures the neighbourhood gains/losses individuals 
experience with spatial mobility. Moves within or into social housing are associated with 
worse neighbourhood outcomes than moves between owned properties. This pattern holds 
across the spectrum of origin neighbourhoods. These results may be due to selection (as 
social renters already live in less advantaged areas prior to moving), but they also imply that 
a reliance on social housing channels people into the least advantaged places. Exiting the 
social or private rental sector for homeownership is also associated with worse outcomes for 
movers originating in the least advantaged neighbourhoods. This indicates that people may 
accept a lower quality of neighbourhood in order to attain homeownership, a finding which is 
consistent with a long-term push towards a ‘homeownership society’.  
As long-distance migration may have different associations with neighbourhood 
quality changes than local residential mobility, the models in Table 8 contain a dummy 
variable disaggregating moves into those less than and greater than 30km. We experimented 
with alternative distance thresholds, but the results did not alter markedly (Boyle et al., 2009). 
The coefficients on this dummy suggest that longer distance moves lead to changes of greater 
magnitude than shorter distance moves. This may be a function of unfamiliarity as 
households take time to know a new environment and find the “best” neighbourhood and 
house that suits their needs. Higher local house prices are associated with gains in 
neighbourhood quality while higher unemployment rates generally increase the deprivation 
scores of movers. Somewhat unexpectedly, higher levels of social housing in the region are 
associated with gains in neighbourhood quality with residential mobility.  
  Finally, we estimate a set of fixed effects models where the dependent variable is the 
IMD score of the neighbourhood the person lives in (Table 9). As in Table 8, we include a 
variety of time-varying and time-constant individual, household and contextual variables in 
these models. Fixed effects models allow us to control for unobserved but time-constant 
heterogeneity by focusing only on the variance in neighbourhood quality over time within 
individuals (Allison, 2009). This is achieved through time-demeaning the data, expressing the 
dependent and independent variables as deviations from their person-specific means (Allison, 
2009). Unlike random effects models, the fixed effects framework therefore enables us to 
control for selection, which in our case may occur if certain types of individuals and 
households are more likely to relocate than others (see Korpi et al., 2010 for a migration 
example). By including an individual level fixed effect for every person, fixed effects models 
do not allow us to estimate parameters for independent variables which are (largely) constant 
over time (such as gender, ethnicity or education). As only movers can experience changes in 
neighbourhood quality, the coefficients can be interpreted as the effects of within-person 
changes on each independent variable on the neighbourhood outcomes of residential moves. 
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***TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
 Paralleling the results from Table 3 and Figure 2, we find that moves from the least 
advantaged areas are associated with gains in neighbourhood quality. In contrast, moves from 
the upper third of neighbourhoods typically involve reductions in quality. Increases in age and 
entering a partnership are associated with moves to more advantaged neighbourhoods for 
people living in the least advantaged places. Interestingly, increasing age leads to small 
reductions in neighbourhood quality for movers from the most advantaged 70% of 
neighbourhoods. Increasing numbers of children seems to be linked to improvements in 
neighbourhood quality for individuals living in the middle ranked and most advantaged 
neighbourhoods. Taken together, these findings indicate that many people move to improve 
their neighbourhood quality when forming new households or expanding their families. 
 Rising household income is associated with improvements in neighbourhood quality 
for individuals across the neighbourhood hierarchy, although most noticeably for movers 
from the least advantaged places. That no significant effects of household income were found 
in the random effects models indicates that individuals with higher incomes may have already 
selected themselves into more advantaged places prior to moving. As expected from our 
previous results and the findings of Rabe and Taylor (2010), moves from homeownership into 
social renting lead to reductions in neighbourhood quality with mobility. This seems to be the 
case regardless of initial neighbourhood type. Moves into private renting from 
homeownership are associated with neighbourhood gains for those living in the least 
advantaged places and quality losses for those in the most advantaged places. This may be 
because of the great diversity within the British private rental sector. Overall, both sets of 
models confirm that housing tenure plays a strong role in conditioning the neighbourhood 
outcomes of residential mobility.   
 
 
Conclusions and Observations 
 
Our analysis extends previous work on processes of movement across the socio-spatial 
hierarchy. Previously, the focus was often on the difficulty of leaving poor neighbourhoods 
and studies often focused solely on those in poverty and those living in poor neighbourhoods 
(Robson et al., 2008). Our models, which cover the entire spectrum of neighbourhoods, 
provide a much richer and more holistic interpretation of the process of mobility across socio-
spatial structures. While to some extent there are no major surprises, this approach allows us 
to show that there is considerable movement across the hierarchy of places. Our results also 
show how the underlying housing structure conditions socio-spatial mobility.  
As might be anticipated from social mobility debates, individual education and 
household income are defining associates of the ability to overcome the structural constraints 
of the housing market and make socio-spatial gains with mobility. Importantly however, the 
results also show that both neighbourhood characteristics and housing tenure clearly structure 
the neighbourhood outcomes associated with residential moves. Both findings point to 
structural inequality in British society and to the difficulty of overcoming that embedded 
inequality. Those living at the bottom of the neighbourhood hierarchy have real difficulty in 
advancing their socio-spatial position through mobility, especially when combined with lower 
incomes and fewer qualifications. At the same time we know that the wide range of 
neighbourhood types in the lowest decile can enable some upward mobility even if the 
households cannot make a decile change. With new data from the UK Understanding Society 
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panel survey we will soon be able to explore the extent to which changes within the most 
disadvantage decile are ‘moves which improve’ rather than residential churn. 
Although we know a good deal how housing tenure conditions mobility, this study 
enriches our understanding of how tenure can work at a macro scale and by advancing or 
inhibiting particular kinds of social change.  Tenure changes are the most important and 
significant predictors of neighbourhood mobility, with becoming a social renter almost by 
definition leading to moves down the neighbourhood hierarchy. This disproportionately 
penalizes the most economically marginalized households who are reliant on social housing 
(Burrows, 1999), as tenure structures force them into the most deprived and opportunity poor 
communities. If one believes in neighbourhood effects, then the poor are disadvantaged both 
by being poor and through their tendency to end up in the most disadvantaged places, 
regardless of whether housing is allocated through market or non-market mechanisms. The 
results emphasize that in the UK the socio-spatial hierarchy, and the opportunities to move to 
better places, is highly stratified by housing tenure.   
In the UK, the impact of the ongoing global economic crisis has reinvigorated debate 
about social opportunity structures. In this context, it is often argued that a society which 
provides opportunities for individuals to move up the social, occupational and economic 
ladders is a society which is more egalitarian than a society which provides barriers and 
constraints to movement through the social hierarchy. But, even if there are no formal barriers 
to social mobility, the attainment of individuals may still be constrained by a cocktail of 
personal and geographic factors. Investigating whether and how various individual, household 
and contextual factors influence the socio-spatial mobility of individuals has been the central 
concern of this paper. 
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Table 1. The distribution of English, Scottish and Welsh IMD scores by IMD decile 
 
Decile English IMD 2004 scores Scottish SIMD 2004 scores Welsh WIMD 2005 scores 
 Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max 
1 4.07 0.61 5.74 3.87 1.03 5.37 4.69 1.40 6.90 
2 7.03 5.75 8.34 6.66 5.38 7.72 8.37 7.00 9.90 
3 9.62 8.35 10.96 8.96 7.75 10.49 11.13 10.00 12.40 
4 12.29 10.96 13.71 11.85 10.55 13.49 13.71 12.40 14.90 
5 15.36 13.72 17.02 15.19 13.54 16.94 16.30 14.90 17.90 
6 18.94 17.02 21.15 18.94 16.96 21.02 19.45 17.90 21.20 
7 23.71 21.16 26.61 23.32 21.07 26.11 23.88 21.30 26.20 
8 30.14 26.61 34.20 29.80 26.17 33.48 29.08 26.40 32.60 
9 39.01 34.21 45.19 39.04 33.58 45.43 37.53 32.80 41.90 
10 56.36 45.26 85.59 57.99 45.53 87.09 52.85 42.50 78.90 
Total 21.27 0.61 85.59 20.71 1.03 87.09 21.84 1.40 78.90 
Source: BHPS with merged IMD data 
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Table 2. Mean attributes of LSOAs/DZs in each deprivation decile by country  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: 2001 Census: Census Area Statistics (England and Wales). Data for Scottish datazones derived from the 2001 Census and supplied by the General Register Office for 
Scotland (Scotland). © Crown Copyright. 
 Mean composition of LSOA/DZ population in 2001 
Country Most advantaged                                                                                                              Least advantaged 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
% non-white ethnic minority           
   England 3.26 3.20 3.94 3.71 4.16 6.42 7.06 10.55 12.04 15.35 
   Wales 2.67 1.31 1.31 1.11 1.31 1.15 1.34 1.30 1.06 1.21 
   Scotland 2.62 2.35 2.18 1.49 1.88 2.17 2.08 1.80 1.67 1.75 
% unemployed           
   England 2.12 2.47 2.81 3.04 3.83 4.48 5.34 6.87 8.80 13.12 
   Wales 2.85 3.79 4.39 4.51 5.12 6.03 6.64 6.97 8.51 11.70 
   Scotland 2.31 2.97 3.16 3.87 4.76 5.59 6.96 8.49 11.86 15.79 
% social renting households           
   England 3.72 6.01 8.13 9.83 11.20 15.03 18.59 27.23 36.01 46.90 
   Wales 2.62 7.44 10.77 11.39 13.24 16.13 19.13 24.54 27.94 44.54 
   Scotland 2.19 5.99 10.99 17.01 23.25 26.50 37.45 44.60 51.07 66.95 
% private renting households           
   England 5.68 6.60 7.30 8.23 8.50 9.85 10.27 12.17 11.38 11.42 
   Wales 4.84 8.60 9.36 9.03 8.85 8.57 11.23 8.04 7.83 5.65 
   Scotland 6.31 7.38 9.15 11.84 10.65 9.50 7.73 7.67 7.41 3.99 
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Table 3. Matrix of changes in neighbourhood decile with mobility 
Decile of neighbourhood 
advantage at wave t 
 
    Most                                                     Decile of neighbourhood advantage at wave t+1                                                               Least  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
Most advantaged 35.68 15.81 14.10 9.62 6.41 6.41 4.70 2.56 3.21 1.50 100 
2 18.79 30.27 15.45 10.44 6.68 6.05 5.85 4.38 1.04 1.04 100 
3 13.25 13.68 23.5 16.24 9.19 8.55 6.41 3.85 3.21 2.14 100 
4 10.78 9.27 16.59 24.57 9.48 7.97 7.76 7.33 4.31 1.94 100 
5 7.11 13.51 11.61 11.14 18.01 12.56 9.95 8.29 5.45 2.37 100 
6 6.88 9.51 8.30 8.91 11.94 21.66 12.96 8.91 6.68 4.25 100 
7 4.22 8.43 8.03 9.44 11.04 13.05 22.69 9.44 6.43 7.23 100 
8 4.16 5.35 5.74 9.70 6.73 9.90 12.28 24.55 12.28 9.31 100 
9 4.05 3.04 6.68 8.10 5.87 9.31 11.74 13.56 24.09 13.56 100 
Least advantaged 1.80 2.00 3.39 3.99 2.79 5.59 9.18 10.78 20.36 40.12 100 
Total 10.52 10.93 11.18 11.10 8.68 10.12 10.45 9.51 8.89 8.62 100 
Source: BHPS 1991-2008, n=4,793 moves1  
1All selected movers known to have moved between an identified origin and destination neighbourhood 
 
19 
 
Table 4a. The percentage of moving individuals by age and origin decile who move up by at least two deciles 
  
 
Age 
More advantaged   Decile   Less advantaged 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
16-34      %  
               n 
  12.42 
19 
23.08 
33 
36.69 
51 
30.77 
52 
44.22 
88 
41.21 
82 
44.33 
90 
40.00 
76 
35-54      % 
               n 
  15.79 
30 
19.39 
38 
27.75 
48 
33.33 
64 
41.44 
75 
42.94 
76 
54.55 
96 
37.78 
68 
55+         % 
               n 
  S.S 17.09 
20 
35.24 
37 
38.89 
49 
36.52 
42 
40.50 
49 
47.27 
52 
42.40 
53 
Note: S.S denotes fewer than 15 cases 
Table 4b. The percentage of moving individuals by age and origin decile who move down by at least two deciles 
 
Age 
More advantaged   Decile   Less advantaged 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
16-34      % 
               n 
52.27 
69 
36.09 
48 
37.25 
57 
28.67 
41 
25.90 
36 
21.89 
37 
12.06 
24 
9.05 
18 
  
35-54      % 
               n 
45.09 
101 
33.48 
78 
27.89 
53 
30.61 
60 
29.48 
51 
18.75 
36 
15.47 
28 
9.60 
17 
  
55+         % 
               n 
48.54 
50 
37.38 
40 
38.66 
46 
28.21 
33 
20.00 
21 
19.05 
24 
13.91 
16 
S.S   
Note: S.S denotes fewer than 15 cases 
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Table 5a. The percentage of moving individuals by household income quartile and origin decile who move up by at least two deciles 
Income 
quartile 
More advantaged   Decile   Less advantaged 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Lowest   % 
                n 
  S.S 13.16 
15 
28.24 
37 
26.92 
49 
38.50 
72 
32.98 
62 
41.40 
89 
35.88 
94 
Highest  % 
                n 
  17.14 
24 
30.36 
34 
50.00 
38 
47.73 
42 
57.14 
40 
51.72 
30 
59.65 
34 
51.22 
21 
Note: S.S denotes fewer than 15 cases 
Table 5b. The percentage of moving individuals by household income quartile and origin decile who move down by at least two deciles 
Income 
quartile 
More advantaged   Decile   Less advantaged 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Lowest   % 
               n 
54.12 
46 
43.68 
38 
45.05 
50 
29.82 
34 
32.06 
42 
24.18 
44 
13.90 
26 
10.11 
19 
  
Highest  % 
               n 
41.22 
61 
31.10 
51 
23.57 
33 
25.00 
28 
S.S S.S S.S S.S   
Note: S.S denotes fewer than 15 cases 
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Table 6a. The percentage of moving individuals by housing tenure and origin decile who move up by at least two deciles 
Housing tenure More advantaged  Decile   Less advantaged 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Homeowner    % 
                         n 
  13.18 
39 
22.67 
68 
34.41 
96 
37.55 
104 
49.81 
133 
52.81 
122 
60.10 
119 
54.36 
81 
Social renter   % 
                         n 
  S.S S.S S.S 
 
29.41 
25 
27.83 
32 
27.07 
36 
39.44 
71 
31.40 
81 
Private renter  % 
                         n 
  17.14 
18 
17.27 
19 
31.71 
26 
29.20 
33 
36.45 
39 
36.97 
44 
41.90 
44 
38.46 
30 
Note: S.S denotes fewer than 15 cases 
Table 6b. The percentage of moving individuals by housing tenure and origin decile who move down by at least two deciles 
Housing tenure More advantaged  Decile   Less advantaged 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Homeowner    % 
                         n 
44.88 
162 
32.05 
117 
30.74 
91 
27.33 
82 
23.30 
65 
15.88 
44 
11.61 
31 
8.23 
19 
  
Social renter   % 
                         n 
S.S S.S 44.00 
22 
42.50 
17 
36.54 
19 
25.88 
22 
17.39 
20 
15.79 
21 
  
Private renter  % 
                         n 
55.13 
43 
42.17 
35 
36.19 
38 
29.09 
32 
28.05 
23 
23.01 
26 
14.02 
15 
S.S   
Note: S.S denotes fewer than 15 cases 
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Table 7. Summary statistics for the sample of movers (n=4,097) 
Categorical variable Frequency % 
Decile of origin neighbourhood 
   Most advantaged 
  
402 9.81 
   2 415 10.13 
   3 405 9.89 
   4 388 9.47 
   5 368 8.98 
   6 411 10.03 
   7 436 10.64 
   8 422 10.30 
   9 423 10.32 
   Least advantaged 427 10.42 
Female dummy (ref male) 2,352 57.41 
Non-white ethnic minority dummy (ref white) 123 3.00 
Partnership status t to t+1 (ref remain couple)   
   Remain single (not cohabiting or married) 1,222 29.83 
   Enter couple 375 9.15 
   Exit couple 285 6.96 
Change in n children under 16 t to t+1 (ref children never present)   
   Same number of children 1,188 29.00 
   Increased number of children 285 6.96 
   Decreased number of children 254 6.20 
Education level (ref very low qualifications)   
   Low (basic secondary school level eg. GCSE) 1,014 24.75 
   Medium (higher school/further education qualifications eg. A level) 1,542 37.64 
   High (university degree and above) 654 15.96 
Change in employment status t to t+1 (ref always employed)   
   Not employed 1,270 31.00 
   Enter employment 192 4.69 
   Exit employment 249 6.08 
Housing tenure change t to t+1 (ref remain owner)   
   Remain social renter 557 13.60 
   Remain private renter 374 9.13 
   Own-social rent 155 3.78 
   Own-private rent 361 8.81 
   Social rent-own 148 3.61 
   Social rent-private rent 120 2.93 
   Private rent-own 379 9.25 
   Private rent-social rent 142 3.47 
Moved >30km dummy (ref moved<30km) 677 16.52 
Year of interview (ref 2007-8)   
   1991-2 612 14.94 
   1993-4 552 13.47 
   1995-6 494 12.06 
   1997-8 417 10.18 
   1999-0 531 12.96 
   2001-2 590 14.40 
   2003-4 400 9.76 
   2005-6 372 9.08 
Continuous variable Mean S.D 
Age 42.76 15.60 
Real household income £/10,000 (2005 prices) 2.70 2.13 
Mean real local authority house prices (2005 prices) 100.26 51.59 
Regional unemployment rate (16-64 year olds) 7.04 2.27 
% social renting in region 22.29 6.29 
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Table 8: Random effects linear regression models of destination neighbourhood IMD score following a move by level of 
neighbourhood advantage of the origin neighbourhood 
 Least advantaged 30% Middle 40% Most advantaged 30% 
 Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Age -0.064 0.177 0.261** 0.121 -0.143 0.148 
Age squared -0.001 0.002 -0.003** 0.001 0.001 0.002 
Female (ref male) -1.549 1.026 -0.279 0.665 0.413 0.589 
Ethnic minority (ref white) 1.825 2.414 0.011 1.877 0.091 1.605 
Partnership status t to t+1 (ref remained couple)     
   Remained single 2.932** 1.158 0.618 0.785 1.909** 0.816 
   Enter couple 2.853* 1.545 1.298 1.010 0.847 1.130 
   Exit couple 3.546* 1.993 2.487** 1.221 -0.499 1.051 
Change in n children <16 (ref never present)      
   Same number of children -0.045 1.184 -0.560 0.766 -1.648** 0.664 
   Increased children 1.676 1.821 -1.886* 1.099 -1.542 1.074 
   Decreased children 2.452 2.218 -0.923 1.104 -0.049 1.511 
Education level (ref very low)       
   Low -2.452* 1.402 -0.286 0.982 -1.346 1.077 
   Medium -3.259** 1.544 -0.686 0.926 -1.552 0.995 
   High -5.200** 1.847 -1.555 1.144 -3.015** 1.066 
Employment status t to t+1 (ref employed)      
   Not employed 2.583* 1.356 1.763* 0.902 0.490 0.894 
   Entered employment 3.223 2.169 0.191 1.309 -1.791 1.139 
   Exited employment 1.110 2.138 1.198 1.217 0.072 1.051 
Household income (£10,000) -0.098 0.341 -0.259 0.213 -0.108 0.116 
Housing tenure t to t+1 (ref owner)      
   Social renter 12.744*** 1.478 7.377*** 1.225 6.486*** 1.963 
   Private renter 3.022* 1.576 1.734* 1.040 1.364 1.151 
   Own-social rent 11.804*** 2.390 8.473*** 1.573 8.470** 2.629 
   Own-private rent 1.650 2.105 1.302 0.974 2.148** 0.915 
   Social rent-own 5.737** 1.926 2.668* 1.475 1.472 2.408 
   Social rent-private rent 6.539** 2.146 5.099 3.267 1.019 2.290 
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   Private rent-own 4.032** 1.641 1.716 1.045 0.587 0.781 
   Private rent-social rent 13.784*** 2.294 8.152*** 2.337 7.244** 3.625 
Moved>30km dummy -8.429*** 1.340 -0.057 0.802 4.944*** 0.826 
Mean local real house price -0.042** 0.016 -0.046*** 0.008 -0.019** 0.007 
Regional unemployment rate 1.314*** 0.390 1.800*** 0.322 0.056 0.364 
Percent social renting in region -0.303** 0.099 -0.219** 0.068 0.073 0.090 
Year of interview (ref 2007-8)       
   1991-2 -11.221*** 3.333 -11.111*** 2.210 -3.255 2.116 
   1993-4 -12.076*** 3.538 -12.106*** 2.351 -1.286 2.457 
   1995-6 -8.707** 3.287 -9.408*** 2.232 -3.731** 1.827 
   1997-8 -7.680** 2.931 -5.504** 2.083 -2.858 1.754 
   1999-2000 -7.618** 2.894 -4.086** 1.948 -1.258 1.590 
   2001-2 -5.248* 2.943 -1.971 1.947 -1.227 1.584 
   2003-4 -3.399 2.813 1.096 1.839 0.210 1.652 
   2005-6 -2.175 2.868 1.249 1.861 1.045 1.565 
Constant 38.669*** 6.164 14.778*** 4.167 18.683*** 4.664 
Rho (individual variance component) 0.012  0.463  0.362 
Overall r2  0.217  0.141  0.156 
Wald chi2 (degrees of freedom)  343.978 (37)  191.383 (37)  156.817 (37) 
N person-years (n individuals)  1272 (921)  1603 (1185)  1222 (899) 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001 Panel robust standard errors 
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Figure 1. Box plot of English LSOA IMD 2004 scores by decile 
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Figure 2. Change in IMD score by IMD score of origin decile for homeowners and social renters (pooled countries with 
English decile lines) 
 
Note: Error introduced to protect the confidentiality of survey participants 
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Table A1. Age disaggregated random effects models of neighbourhood deprivation after a move from the least advantaged 30% of neighbourhoods 
 
 Full sample  Under 35  35 and over  
 Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE 
Age -0.064 0.177 -0.803 2.128 -0.045 0.349 
Age squared -0.001 0.002 0.012 0.039 -0.001 0.003 
Female dummy -1.549 1.026 -1.879 1.617 -1.486 1.318 
Ethnic minority dummy (ref ethnic) 1.825 2.414 -0.607 2.813 5.767 4.209 
Couple status t to t+1 (ref couple)       
   Remained single 2.932** 1.158 4.836** 1.887 2.077 1.486 
   Entered couple 2.853* 1.545 5.971** 2.179 -1.384 2.251 
   Exited couple 3.546* 1.993 4.006 2.609 3.905 3.236 
Presence of children t to t+1 (ref never)       
   Same number of children -0.045 1.184 2.047 1.918 0.500 1.765 
   Increased children 1.676 1.821 3.600 2.581 3.754 2.862 
   Decreased children 2.452 2.218 6.054 4.149 1.425 2.465 
Education level (ref v low)       
   Low -2.452* 1.402 -1.397 2.480 -2.505 1.687 
   Medium -3.259** 1.544 -2.544 2.676 -3.699** 1.885 
   High -5.200** 1.847 -5.609* 3.098 -4.347* 2.542 
Employment status t to t+1 (ref emp.)       
   Not employed 2.583* 1.356 2.612 2.378 2.472 1.708 
   Entered employment  3.223 2.169 -0.256 2.700 10.106** 4.069 
   Exited employment 1.110 2.138 1.611 2.982 0.529 2.916 
Household income/10,000 -0.098 0.341 -0.352 0.552 -0.192 0.404 
Housing tenure t to t+1 (ref owner)       
   Social renter 12.744*** 1.478 9.297*** 2.546 13.603*** 1.767 
   Private renter 3.022* 1.576 2.523 2.380 1.646 2.344 
   Own-social rent 11.804*** 2.390 7.001 5.621 12.195*** 2.753 
   Own-private rent 1.650 2.105 3.066 3.406 0.152 2.482 
   Social rent-own 5.737** 1.926 1.360 3.039 7.857** 2.490 
   Social rent-rent 6.539** 2.146 3.899 3.369 7.385** 2.930 
   Private rent-own 4.032** 1.641 6.565** 2.086 -1.538 2.381 
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   Private rent-social rent 13.784*** 2.294 13.140*** 3.318 13.052*** 3.090 
Moved >30km dummy -8.429*** 1.340 -6.582** 2.077 -9.930*** 1.587 
Mean local house price/1000 (£) -0.042** 0.016 -0.023 0.038 -0.040** 0.016 
Regional unemployment rate 1.314*** 0.390 1.366** 0.583 0.987* 0.576 
% stock social rented in region -0.303** 0.099 -0.198 0.146 -0.325** 0.144 
Year of interview (ref 2007-8)       
   1991-2 -11.221*** 3.333 -22.870** 7.093 -5.669 4.043 
   1993-4 -12.076*** 3.538 -20.871** 7.618 -10.458** 4.131 
   1995-6 -8.707** 3.287 -16.263** 6.982 -9.049** 3.739 
   1997-8 -7.680** 2.931 -16.184** 6.833 -8.028** 3.256 
   1999-0 -7.618** 2.894 -17.308** 6.743 -7.081** 3.179 
   2001-2 -5.248* 2.943 -13.651** 6.354 -5.741* 3.099 
   2003-4 -3.399 2.813 -11.926* 6.542 -3.318 3.028 
   2005-6 -2.175 2.868 -13.209* 7.195 -1.648 3.140 
Constant 38.669*** 6.164 52.795* 29.893 41.113*** 11.557 
Rho 0.012  0.154  0.045  
Overall r2 0.217  0.218  0.259  
Chi2 343.978  159.093  290.065  
Degrees of freedom 37.000  37.000  37.000  
N 1272.000  529.000  743.000  
N clusters 921.000  358.000  605.000  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001 Panel robust standard errors 
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Table A2. Age disaggregated random effects models of neighbourhood deprivation after a move from the middle 40% of 
neighbourhoods 
 
 Full sample  Under 35  35 and over  
 Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE 
Age 0.261** 0.121 -0.036 1.452 0.310 0.231 
Age squared -0.003** 0.001 0.001 0.026 -0.004* 0.002 
Female dummy -0.279 0.665 -0.716 1.152 0.014 0.839 
Ethnic minority dummy (ref white) 0.011 1.877 -0.531 3.025 0.370 2.132 
Couple status t to t+1 (ref couple)       
   Remained single 0.618 0.785 0.941 1.430 0.448 0.930 
   Entered couple 1.298 1.010 1.299 1.506 0.759 1.411 
   Exited couple 2.487** 1.221 1.282 2.014 2.591 1.583 
Presence of children t to t+1 (ref never)       
   Same number of children -0.560 0.766 -1.155 1.263 0.103 1.060 
   Increased children -1.886* 1.099 -1.725 1.697 -1.977 1.426 
   Decreased children -0.923 1.104 2.096 2.503 -1.619 1.295 
Education level (ref very low)       
   Low -0.286 0.982 -1.102 2.207 -0.535 1.127 
   Medium -0.686 0.926 -3.381 2.107 0.433 1.040 
   High -1.555 1.144 -3.286 2.433 -1.795 1.325 
Employment status t to t+1 (ref emp.)       
   Not employed 1.763* 0.902 0.995 1.560 2.211* 1.140 
   Entered employment 0.191 1.309 -0.550 2.046 1.562 2.021 
   Exited employment 1.198 1.217 1.387 2.125 1.050 1.517 
Household income -0.259 0.213 0.199 0.263 -0.594*** 0.154 
Housing tenure t to t+1 (ref owner)       
   Social renter 7.377*** 1.225 5.100** 2.136 8.991*** 1.462 
   Private renter 1.734* 1.040 1.819 1.584 2.011 1.410 
   Own-social rent 8.473*** 1.573 11.028** 3.453 7.993*** 1.708 
   Own-private rent 1.302 0.974 1.757 1.711 1.532 1.171 
   Social rent-own 2.668* 1.475 0.785 2.407 2.645 1.797 
   Social rent-private rent 5.099 3.267 -0.442 3.146 10.277** 4.612 
   Private rent-own 1.716 1.045 2.049 1.763 1.113 1.202 
   Private rent-social rent 8.152*** 2.337 5.287 3.599 11.448*** 3.165 
Moved >30km dummy -0.057 0.802 -1.232 1.463 0.698 0.969 
Mean local house price (£1,000) -0.046*** 0.008 -0.047** 0.017 -0.049*** 0.009 
Regional unemployment rate 1.800*** 0.322 1.769*** 0.524 1.930*** 0.433 
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% stock social rented in region -0.219** 0.068 -0.181* 0.102 -0.282** 0.097 
Year of interview (ref 2007-8)       
   1991-2 -11.111*** 2.210 -11.204** 5.193 -12.563*** 2.553 
   1993-4 -12.106*** 2.351 -11.663** 5.397 -14.095*** 2.724 
   1995-6 -9.408*** 2.232 -9.436* 5.198 -10.600*** 2.492 
   1997-8 -5.504** 2.083 -5.325 5.010 -5.910** 2.284 
   1999-0 -4.086** 1.948 -5.816 4.909 -4.017* 2.117 
   2001-2 -1.971 1.947 -3.581 4.901 -2.042 2.125 
   2003-4 1.096 1.839 1.581 4.740 0.598 1.955 
   2005-6 1.249 1.861 2.802 4.975 0.484 1.958 
Constant 14.778*** 4.167 20.719 19.971 15.352** 7.230 
Rho 0.463  0.433  0.555  
Overall r2 0.141  0.122  0.180  
Chi2 191.383  70.748  190.791  
Degrees of freedom 37.000  37.000  37.000  
N 1603.000  594.000  1009.000  
N clusters 1185.000  427.000  811.000  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001 Panel robust standard errors 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
Table A3. Age disaggregated random effects models of neighbourhood deprivation after a move from the most advantaged 
30% of neighbourhoods 
 
 Full sample  Under 35  35 and over  
 Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE 
Age -0.143 0.148 -1.099 2.436 0.026 0.249 
Age squared 0.001 0.002 0.017 0.043 -0.000 0.002 
Female dummy 0.413 0.589 -0.851 1.204 0.805 0.724 
Ethnic minority dummy (ref white) 0.091 1.605 5.291* 3.135 -1.076 1.796 
Couple status t to t+1 (ref couple)       
   Remained single 1.909** 0.816 0.709 1.644 2.347** 0.972 
   Entered couple 0.847 1.130 2.575 2.208 -1.017 1.225 
   Exited couple -0.499 1.051 -0.272 2.035 -1.156 1.191 
Presence of children t to t+1 (ref never)       
   Same number of children -1.648** 0.664 -2.511* 1.429 -1.058 0.877 
   Increased children -1.542 1.074 -2.067 1.694 0.339 1.418 
   Decreased children -0.049 1.511 -1.620 2.316 0.618 1.843 
Education level (ref v low)       
   Low -1.346 1.077 -3.091 2.732 -1.236 1.233 
   Medium -1.552 0.995 -2.176 2.502 -1.893* 1.100 
   High -3.015** 1.066 -3.420 2.624 -3.179** 1.206 
Employment status t to t+1 (ref emp.)       
   Not employed 0.490 0.894 0.680 1.901 0.073 1.033 
   Entered employment -1.791 1.139 -3.185** 1.602 -0.661 1.486 
   Exited employment 0.072 1.051 -1.185 1.648 0.611 1.310 
Household income -0.108 0.116 -0.465* 0.270 -0.060 0.135 
Housing tenure t to t+1 (ref owner)       
   Social renter 6.486*** 1.963 7.506** 2.648 5.597** 2.598 
   Private renter 1.364 1.151 1.135 2.168 1.237 1.300 
   Own-social rent 8.470** 2.629 17.840* 9.287 6.428** 2.272 
   Own-private rent 2.148** 0.915 0.611 1.621 2.631** 1.106 
   Social rent-own 1.472 2.408 -1.453 1.950 3.191 4.298 
   Social rent-private rent 1.019 2.290 1.908 2.381 0.896 3.864 
   Private rent-own 0.587 0.781 0.364 1.527 0.933 0.844 
   Private rent-social rent 7.244** 3.625 11.779** 5.480 4.588 4.913 
Moved >30km dummy 4.944*** 0.826 4.300** 1.666 4.490*** 0.873 
Mean local house price (£1,000) -0.019** 0.007 -0.034* 0.018 -0.019** 0.007 
Regional unemployment rate 0.056 0.364 0.720 0.602 -0.396 0.490 
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% stock social rented in region 0.073 0.090 -0.018 0.111 0.133 0.132 
Year of interview       
   1991-2 -3.255 2.116 -3.799 4.273 -2.142 2.679 
   1993-4 -1.286 2.457 -1.922 4.737 -0.174 3.067 
   1995-6 -3.731** 1.827 -3.751 4.283 -2.705 2.075 
   1997-8 -2.858 1.754 -2.740 3.898 -2.007 1.942 
   1999-0 -1.258 1.590 -0.425 3.797 -1.217 1.654 
   2001-2 -1.227 1.584 0.044 3.657 -0.690 1.568 
   2003-4 0.210 1.652 2.497 4.164 -0.068 1.704 
   2005-6 1.045 1.565 5.356 3.574 0.444 1.576 
Constant 18.683*** 4.664 33.786 35.311 14.588* 7.698 
Rho 0.362  0.235  0.452  
Overall r2 0.156  0.232  0.150  
Chi2 156.817  111.907  130.372  
Degrees of freedom 37.000  37.000  37.000  
N 1222.000  373.000  849.000  
N clusters 899.000  282.000  675.000  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001 Panel robust standard errors 
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Table 9. Fixed effects linear regression models of neighbourhood IMD score by level of neighbourhood advantage at the 
previous wave 
 
 Least advantaged 30% Middle 40% Most advantaged 30% 
 Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff SE 
Residential move (ref no move)       
   Moved <=30km -7.669*** 0.466 0.534* 0.286 3.376*** 0.244 
   Moved>30km -18.088*** 1.524 0.236 0.697 6.665*** 0.722 
Age -0.192** 0.087 0.084** 0.042 0.086** 0.038 
Age squared 0.001** 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
Couple (ref single) -1.206** 0.399 -0.525** 0.189 -0.040 0.147 
N children <16 -0.203 0.218 -0.274*** 0.067 -0.125* 0.072 
Employment status (ref employed)       
   Unemployed -0.264 0.323 0.220 0.190 0.079 0.243 
   Out of labour force -0.095 0.254 0.061 0.102 -0.099 0.068 
Real household income (£10,000) -0.154** 0.056 -0.043** 0.020 -0.019** 0.009 
Housing tenure (ref homeowner)       
   Social renter 2.075** 0.636 1.495*** 0.387 2.347*** 0.627 
   Private renter -1.493* 0.796 -0.175 0.374 1.144** 0.397 
Mean local real house price (£1,000) -0.010* 0.005 -0.015*** 0.002 -0.006** 0.002 
Regional unemployment rate 0.035 0.114 -0.052 0.048 0.054 0.048 
% social renting in region 0.176* 0.093 0.114** 0.041 0.045 0.045 
Constant 44.601*** 4.667 13.027*** 2.359 2.168 2.149 
Rho (Individual level variance component) 0.866  0.832  0.813  
Within r2 0.201  0.022  0.199  
Degrees of freedom 21  21  21  
N person-years (n individuals) 19717(2573) 29488(3573) 22925(2626) 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001 Note: Extra controls included for year of interview (parameters not shown). Panel robust standard errors. 
